Attention now turns to Anutin’s cabinet, charged with implementing the PP deal and addressing broader challenges such as the border conflict with Cambodia and a stagnant economy. With PP not taking cabinet seats, the allocation for each coalition partner is higher than usual. Bhumjaithai, as the lead party, will take the lion’s share, followed by Kla Tham, Palang Pracharath, United Thai Nation, Democrat, and the breakaway faction from Pheu Thai (see draft cabinet list below).

Anutin’s special cabinet is notably handing key posts to outsiders: Bowornsak Uwanno, a former constitutional drafter, as deputy prime minister for legal affairs; Sihasak Phuangketkeow, former permanent secretary for foreign affairs, as foreign minister; and Suphajee Suthumpun, chief executive of Dusit International, as commerce minister. Using “surplus seats” to bring in seasoned hands compensates for BJT’s shallow bench and bolsters the cabinet’s credibility. The move also avoids the appearance of political greed and offers a subtle nod to conservatives.

Anutin is expected to double hat as prime minister and interior minister, while fellow party members take digital economy and society, transport, higher education, science, research and innovation, and culture. Reclaiming the interior ministry is a symbolic victory over Thaksin and Pheu Thai forces that had ousted him. It also provides a key lever of state power, controlling local patronage networks and influence ahead of the next election. Anutin may also undo Pheu Thai’s recent ministerial reshuffle. Several senior officials previously seen as loyal to him had been moved.

He will also look to keep a lid on the party’s simmering controversies, including the Senate election collusion and Khao Kradong cases. The latter involves shadow BJT leader Newin Chidchob’s sprawling sports complex in his home province of Buriram, where the court has ruled the land belongs to the state railway, yet the interior minister has not revoked the title deeds. Pheu Thai moved to accelerate the revocations after Anutin’s removal, but his return may allow renewed influence.

Similarly, the special investigations department recently sought to expand investigations into the case, but with a new justice minister whose career included significant time in Buriram, it is unclear whether the probe will be pursued vigorously. The ministry, which also oversees the corrections department, now faces the complicated task of managing Thaksin’s incarceration following today’s guilty verdict.

The cabinet list’s finalization has reportedly been delayed by a tussle over the defense portfolio, with Kla Tham leader Thamanat Prompow vying for the post and Palang Pracharath’s Prawit Wongsuwon backing his protégé, Gen. Nat Intharacharoen.

A last-minute twist may see caretaker deputy defence minister Gen. Nattaphon Nakpanich retain his role under a “special quota”; he had previously been counted under United Thai Nation’s. Once the draft list is settled, the cabinet secretary will conduct background and qualification checks, expected to take 7–10 days, before submission to the king for approval.

Anutin’s cabinet is likely to last only four months, barring a breakdown of his deal with PP. He is expected to stick to the agreement to project trust and credibility, which could boost his vote share in the next election. He might even consider an early dissolution to strengthen his campaign, though that would be ambitious.

With such a short term and a minority in the House, major legislation will be difficult. Anutin will therefore focus on extracting gains from existing budgets through recycling or rebranding projects, while using state machinery to maintain his political advantage.

Taken together, these moves underscore the cabinet’s broader aim of securing allies and stability as BJT prepares for an election aimed at drawing seats away from Pheu Thai and capitalizing on recent conservative momentum.

Share

Subscribe now

Since Paetongtarn’s removal, momentum has shifted in favor of a PP–BJT tie-up. BJT leader Anutin Charnvirakul wasted no time after the verdict in courting figures across the political spectrum, even managing to peel away PT support through factional and coalition party defections. By contrast, PT’s candidate Chaikasem Nitisiri has remained aloof, leaving caretaker PM Phumtham Wechayachai to negotiate with PP and its coalition partners. Chaikasem himself confesses that he is enjoying retirement and is not interested in the job, though he is ready to serve if called upon.

With roughly half as many MPs as PT, BJT may also be a more strategic choice for PP. A weaker partner can be kept on a tighter leash, easing concerns that it may later renege on its agreement to dissolve the House within four months. Indeed, there is talk of a tacit understanding to cap the coalition size to reassure PP. BJT’s strong interest in a swift House dissolution also makes it an attractive partner.

Anutin, for his part, is exuding a quiet confidence—as if a deal with PP is already in hand—in stark contrast to Pheu Thai, which appears bruised and uncertain about its support. He was recently spotted sipping coffee at his café and enjoying a meal of braised goose at a famous restaurant he frequents, coincidentally the same one where he dined with Thaksin years ago, with pictures of the former premier still on the wall.

Anutin is also said to be drawing up a cabinet list, something he has been planning since leaving the coalition. The tentative list has Anutin serving as both PM and Interior Minister, while Kla Tham would retain the agriculture portfolio. Three key ministerial posts—Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Commerce—would be reserved for outsiders. Defense posts would go to officers Anutin has cultivated trust with in recent years, potentially including those within Palang Pracharath leader Prawit Wongsuwon’s network.

Sensing that PT’s chances of striking a deal with PP may be slipping, Phumtham told the press yesterday that his caretaker authority gives him the power to request a House dissolution. His comment has raised eyebrows, prompting speculation that PT is considering this as a last-resort option. If carried out, the PT–BJT alliance would be left grounded. Ironically, however, this would give PP exactly what it wants: an immediate dissolution and fresh elections.

Whether the caretaker prime minister has the constitutional authority to request such a dissolution remains uncertain. Notably, the government’s legal adviser, Secretary-General of the Council of State Pakorn Nilprapunt, has reiterated that the acting prime minister lacks this authority. He also warned that, since the request goes to the King, “All actions should be undertaken with caution, avoiding any impact on the monarchy. The King remains uninvolved in politics... Anyone proposing actions must take full responsibility for them.” The statement reads as both a strong warning and a subtle admonition to PT.

Some observers have suggested cynically that Thaksin might push for a House dissolution to sow controversy and confusion that could justify a military intervention—though the probability of such a military intervention is low. He may also be factoring in his upcoming court verdict on September 9, which, if he is found guilty, could reinstate his one-year incarceration. In this scenario, Thaksin would likely want control of the Ministry of Justice to ensure he can serve out the sentence under a homestay arrangement. However, if BJT is in charge, Thaksin could see his requests thwarted.

PP has been weighing its options since Monday, yet the party has still not settled on which camp to support. Some MPs and supporters remain reluctant to endorse either PT or BJT. Even so, party leader Natthaphong Ruangpanyawut (Teng) has already committed publicly to PP’s terms for a partnership at its press conference on August 25. Backtracking now would be quite surprising and could prove politically costly for the party.

If a deal is reached with either party and a prime minister is voted in this week, a greater degree of political clarity could follow, and the subsequent timeline could proceed rapidly. The next government’s policy announcement could come on October 1, followed by a House dissolution in early February, elections in April, and a new government formed by early May.

A decision by PP is expected this morning at 9:30 am, when it is set to meet. Yet surprises remain possible, and a seven-to-eight-month transitional government with a limited mandate is unlikely to deliver the bold policies Thailand needs to address its immediate structural economic and social challenges.

Share

Subscribe now

Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s Hun Sen “Leaked Tape” Case

The Constitutional Court will hear testimony from Paetongtarn and a single National Security Council official on August 21, after the court allowed only one of several witnesses she had requested. Closing arguments are scheduled for August 27, with judges set to vote and announce their ruling on August 29 at 3 p.m.

The prevailing expectation is that the court will find Paetongtarn guilty and remove her from office. An initial 7–2 vote to suspend Paetongtarn suggests a strong leaning against her. Previous rulings have removed prime ministers for far less—including Samak Sundaravej’s payment for a cooking show, Yingluck Shinawatra’s improper transfer of a state official, and Srettha Thavisin’s appointment of a minister with a checkered past.

The court’s reputation may also weigh on its deliberations. A ruling in Paetongtarn’s favour could prove damaging, given that public and military opinion is broadly unfavourable towards her. A recent NIDA Poll found that over 54% of respondents had no confidence in her government’s ability to protect the national interest.

A small minority view holds that Paetongtarn may avoid conviction, as her father did in 2001. Then, Thaksin was cleared in an 8–7 ruling that found no deliberate concealment of his assets. Paetongtarn’s defense similarly rests on claims of good-faith conduct. Yet Thaksin had just come off a commanding election victory, whereas today the Shinawatras and Pheu Thai have never been more unpopular.

Rumors abounded earlier this week that Paetongtarn may resign before the verdict if she receives indications of an adverse outcome—or if a deal is struck exchanging her resignation for other political concessions. Asked by reporters on Tuesday, she smiled but did not reply, in contrast to previous occasions when she flatly dismissed calls to step down.

Pheu Thai urged the court on the same day to postpone the ruling for six months, citing the need for continuity of leadership to deal with pressing foreign and domestic challenges. The court’s announcement of the verdict date the next day suggested that plea was summarily ignored.

Former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s Lese Majeste, Computer Crimes, and Hospital Stay Cases

Thaksin faces charges under Section 112 of the Criminal Code and the Computer Crimes Act over a 2015 interview with South Korean media, which prosecutors say insulted the monarchy. Together, the charges carry a possible sentence of three to 15 years in prison. The Criminal Court is due to deliver its verdict on August 22.

Any conviction would almost certainly be appealed by Thaksin’s lawyers; the public prosecutor would do the same if he were acquitted. Pundits downplay the political impact of the case, noting that a final ruling will come well after more consequential ones, like his daughter’s and the Section 144 case. Opinion is equally divided on whether the court will convict him.

Thaksin also faces allegations that he received preferential treatment on the 14th floor of the Police General Hospital during his one-year sentence. A guilty verdict by the Supreme Court’s Criminal Division for Holders of Political Office could reinstate the one-year term, though his age would allow him to request serving the term outside prison, possibly at home. The verdict is due on September 9.

Many commentators expect a conviction in this case, sparking speculation over whether Thaksin will remain in the country or leave once more. Others suggest the court could spare him while punishing the officials responsible for his treatment. Backroom deals to avoid punishment cannot be ruled out in any of these cases.

National Anti-Corruption Commission’s Section 144 Case

The National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) is currently reviewing several complaints under Section 144 of the Constitution, including one tied to the digital wallet program implicating 309 MPs, 175 senators, and the cabinet. If the NACC finds merit, cases will be referred to the Constitutional Court for a final ruling within 15 days, according to petitioner and former Constitution Drafting Committee advisor Jade Donavanik.

Punishments could range from light to severe depending on the court’s interpretation. MPs or senators unaware of violations might receive leniency, whereas cabinet members and budget committee officials are more likely to be held culpable. Donavanik, who has his own stake, puts the likelihood of removal for all those accused at 70–80 percent, citing the court’s recent precedent-setting decision against Pheu Thai MP Pichet Chuamuangphan.

The NACC accepted the case on June 9, pledging to conclude within 60 days, by August 9. That deadline has passed, and the decision remains pending. The petitioners pressed the NACC this week to move more quickly, but it is not legally bound to the deadline and could delay further while the Paetongtarn case is decided.

Instability to Persist Regardless of Court Convictions or Acquittals

Political instability will endure, whatever the courts decide. Some rulings may prove more disruptive than others, but volatility is set to remain a defining feature in the weeks—and possibly months—ahead.

The form this takes will hinge on the verdicts, each carrying distinct risks.

A verdict in favor of Paetongtarn would stoke the loose anti-Shinawatra coalition, including the military. Protests would likely follow, again calling for her resignation. Some groups might push for a House dissolution, while more extreme elements could demand a military putsch. Given the government’s very low approval ratings, such movements could attract more supporters—or at least greater public sympathy.

Even if Chaikasem replaces her, his tenure could falter quickly, lacking the mandate and credibility to reassure the public, military, or bureaucracy. As Thaksin’s choice and without a political base of his own, he would struggle to assert independence and command over the coalition. His past stance on monarchy reform may also invite fresh lawfare. Pheu Thai’s fortunes are unlikely to recover under him, and his leadership could hasten a House dissolution—or produce other unforeseen consequences.

Further uncertainty could come from a Section 144 ruling removing the cabinet and much of parliament. Permanent secretaries would run day-to-day affairs while the legislature lay paralyzed. If remaining MPs resigned, Article 5—which requires unresolved matters to follow “constitutional practice” under the King—could come into play. Its ambiguity leaves it unclear how the deadlock would be resolved, whether through the court allowing the Election Commission to hold an election or by less democratic means.

A less turbulent outcome could occur if the People’s Party’s proposal for a transitional government with a clear, limited mandate is adopted. It would have the party back a prime minister candidate, possibly Bhumjaithai leader Anutin Charnvirakul, but not formally join the new government. The party would receive constitutional reform commitments, followed by a House dissolution and election.

Pundits are divided on its chance of success: some dismiss it as impractical, while others see it as an appealing out for coalition partners, offering more cabinet posts and a chance to limit electoral damage from association with an unpopular Pheu Thai.

Many other scenarios remain in play: the possible return of Prayut Chan-o-cha, an attempt by acting prime minister Phumtham Wechayachai to dissolve the House—potentially challenged in court or rebuffed by the palace—and outcomes yet unimagined. The rest of the month, and likely beyond, promises to test political loyalties and institutions, keeping all sides on edge and observers guessing.

Subscribe now

Share

Chiang Rai’s Constituency 7 was highly competitive in the 2023 general election, with Pheu Thai’s Pichet winning 33.96% of the vote (31,588 votes), just 5,699 votes—or 6.13%—ahead of Move Forward Party’s Prayat Siangdang, who took 27.83% (25,889 votes). Bhumjaithai’s Miranti Bunkaeo finished third with 19.51% (18,153 votes), 13,435 votes behind Pichet.

Pheu Thai is expected to discuss both a replacement for Pichet as deputy house speaker and its candidate for the Chiang Rai by-election at its weekly meeting tomorrow. If the deputy speaker post remains with a Pheu Thai member from the north, Cholnan Srikaew—a Nan MP and former public health minister—could be a contender. The Election Commission has not announced a date for the by-election, but it must be held within 45 days of the court’s verdict.

The by-election will serve as a critical barometer of Pheu Thai’s standing in the wake of the recent border crisis with Cambodia. Recent polling suggests a significant decline in the party’s popularity, raising the prospect that the race will be far more competitive than in 2023—or even result in a loss for the party. A loss would send a strong signal to Pheu Thai MPs in competitive constituencies about their own electoral vulnerability. It could also prompt some to switch parties ahead of the next general election.

Beyond the immediate stakes in Chiang Rai, the court’s ruling last week could set the stage for a much broader political reckoning. The National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) is currently reviewing three high-profile complaints under Section 144, including one tied to the digital wallet program implicating 309 MPs and 175 senators. If the NACC finds the complaints to have merit, the cases will be referred to the Constitutional Court for a final ruling.

Should the court hear the cases, a verdict is likely to come after its decision on Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s leaked conversation with former Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen. If she is removed and the court later finds a Section 144 breach, an unprecedented constitutional and political crisis could unfold. The House could be left with fewer than 200 MPs, and the survival of the prime minister and cabinet would come into question. While Section 144 mandates that the cabinet vacate en masse if found guilty, the government at the time of the verdict may not be the same one that authorized the budget changes at issue—raising uncertainty over whether the court would apply the punishment to the new government.

Such a crisis would have serious negative repercussions for political stability, the economy, and national security by heightening uncertainty, destabilizing key institutions, and eroding confidence. It would also underscore the judiciary’s sweeping power to reset the political order, including the removal of elected governments and mass disqualification of lawmakers. The turmoil could ultimately lead to a House dissolution and fresh elections, though the outcome remains uncertain amid an unresolved border conflict and a fragile domestic political and economic situation.

For more details and analysis on Section 144 check out Ken Lohatepanont’s post here.

Subscribe now

Share

If the military were to intervene—something it has done 22 times since 1932—it would likely move on two grounds: the need for an impartial figure to safeguard national interests, and the absence of clear, unified leadership within the current government. While other reasons might be cited, these two are the most credible and relevant to the present context.

Former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his daughter, suspended Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, are accused of precipitating the crisis—due to a falling out with the former Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen over opaque personal dealings.

Critics argue that this family feud has left the government irreparably compromised, with national security decisions now entangled in a complicated web of personal and political interests. The only remedy, they contend, is to remove the Shinawatras and their network from power and install an honest broker.

The absence of unified leadership has added to the growing unease. Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra remains suspended from duty, and the defense portfolio remains unfilled. Meanwhile, Acting Prime Minister Phumtham Wechayachai has struggled to project authority, drawing criticism for deflecting responsibility early in the crisis and focusing instead on his new role as Interior Minister. His characterization of the BM-21 rocket barrages and F-16 airstrikes as merely a “clash” further undermined confidence in his command of the situation.

Foreign Minister Maris Sangiampongsa, a longtime Thaksin ally, has also come under strong criticism for a slow and muted response to the crisis, allowing Cambodia to seize control of the narrative—particularly in international media and diplomatic circles. Although Maris has since issued press statements and given briefings, including shuttling to New York for the UN Security Council meeting, it will take a sustained effort to dispel the perception of an absentee minister acting under Thaksin’s direction.

The Shinawatras’ conflict of interest—and, by extension, that of the entire cabinet—combined with a leadership vacuum, has created fertile ground for military intervention. This could take the form of a direct takeover by the army chief and infantry units or unfold through a more circuitous route involving a parliamentary realignment that brings back former Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha. The latter scenario is currently seen as more likely by political watchers.

A direct coup is the least preferred option because it would reward Hun Sen—who has openly called for regime change—while the economic and diplomatic fallout from the U.S. and European capitals could be severe. Moreover, the military is already fully engaged in the border conflict, making political management an unwelcome additional burden.

In any case, the government has already ceded much of its authority to the armed forces to manage the situation. If—and it is a big if—the government does not interfere with or undermine the military’s position, a coup may prove unnecessary.

If not a direct military takeover, the more likely route would be a parliamentary power play akin to 2008, when political factions—under military pressure—abandoned Thaksin’s People’s Power Party-led coalition following a court-ordered dissolution and joined with the Democrats to install Abhisit Vejjajiva as prime minister.

Under this scenario, a parliamentary realignment would follow Paetongtarn’s likely removal from office by the Constitutional Court. A new coalition would then form—drawing votes from both government and opposition blocs—and elect former Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha as Paetongtarn’s replacement.

The case for Prayut over Pheu Thai’s candidate, Chaikasem Nitisiri, has strengthened due to the recent military outbreak, though it is not guaranteed. Prayut is seen by many as having crucial leadership qualities that Chaikasem lacks—most notably military experience, a perception of political neutrality, and a degree of baramee .

He may also be better positioned to manage relations with Hun Sen, given their shared military backgrounds and the relatively stable border relations during Prayut’s tenure. In Prayut’s final year, the two countries resumed talks over the Overlapping Claims Area in the Gulf of Thailand—discussions that could pave the way for joint development of oil and gas reserves estimated at up to $300 billion.

Prayut’s return would be permissible under parliamentary rules—he is one of United Thai Nation Party’s official candidates—though it would nearly amount to a backdoor coup. With Prayut at the helm, the leadership vacuum would be filled, and the government and military's strategic posture and communications would be aligned. The public is also more likely to view Prayut as a neutral figure who can be trusted to safeguard national interests, compared to Thaksin.

That said, some political camps question whether the military can truly serve as an honest broker on border issues, given its reported deep ties to grey business syndicates that profit from both legal and illicit cross-border trade. It’s also worth noting that Hun Sen’s call for regime change may reflect a belief that his political network’s casino, call center, and other grey business interests along the border would be more likely to thrive under Thailand’s previous power arrangement.

Whether there is a military coup, a parliamentary power play, or Pheu Thai simply remaining in power, the underlying drivers of this conflict point strongly to a mix of dynastic conflict between the Shinawatra and Hun clans and Hun Sen’s ambition to cement his legacy through political and military victories—while strengthening the position of his son, whose premiership remains relatively untested.

Subscribe now

Share

The evening’s headliner, of course, was former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra—Pheu Thai’s unofficial leader and, more recently, the self-appointed “national clerk.” His keynote speech was said to be light on strategic substance and heavy on nostalgic detours, though the message was clear: he’s still in charge, and the need to deliver results is urgent. That urgency, however, may also hint at growing desperation, as the party scrambles to assert control where it has been outflanked by opponents like the Bhumjaithai Party.

Meanwhile, largely overshadowed by the dinner theater, the Cabinet made a much-anticipated economic appointment, naming Vitai Ratanakorn as the next governor of the Bank of Thailand. Vitai, 54, comes from the Government Savings Bank and edged out Roong Mallikamas, a central bank insider. His appointment is widely seen as Thaksin’s choice, with reports suggesting the decision came down to: “We want someone who will work for us.” This move signals Thaksin is going full throttle—brushing aside concerns of a conservative backlash.

With Vitai in place, the government now effectively controls both fiscal and monetary policy. Supporters argue that his leadership could revive growth through lower interest rates, a more competitive baht, and reduced debt burdens for small borrowers. Critics, however, warn that monetary policy risks becoming politicized—subject to short-term political pressure and disconnected from macroeconomic fundamentals. Most investors expect central bank independence and institutional neutrality, and any perception of political interference would raise red flags.

Ironically, when Finance Minister Pichai Chunhavajira was asked why Vitai was chosen, he replied: “There were several qualified candidates, but let’s observe how the market responds.” The market responded indeed: the SET dropped more than 1% by the close after the announcement. Markets are a random walk, of course—but the timing of the appointment and the market’s reaction was difficult to ignore.

Speculation has since emerged that Roong may resign and take early retirement. Vitai’s first meeting as chair of the Monetary Policy Committee is scheduled for October 8. Given his close alignment with the government and the bank’s conservative orthodoxy, it is worth watching whether upcoming MPC votes become more contested—and whether monetary policy begins drifting in a more populist direction, or strikes a healthier balance.

Several other significant appointments were made on Tuesday. First, the Senate—dominated by Bhumjaithai—appointed Sarawut Songsivilai, a former Highways Department director-general, to the Constitutional Court. Sarawut is reportedly tied to the Bhumjaithai network, having previously served under Saksayam Chidchob, the former transport minister and brother of party power broker Newin Chidchob. At the same time, the Senate voted down Sutthum Chueaprakhobkit, a public administration academic who has served as an adviser to Justice Minister Tawee Sodsong.

The Senate also appointed Narong Klanwarin, currently a Supreme Court judge, to the Election Commission (EC), while nine-term Pheu Thai MP from Roi-Et, Chalard Khamchuang, was selected by the House as the second deputy House Speaker, replacing the vacancy left by Bhumjaithai when it moved into the opposition.

Phue Thai’s Bank of Thailand governor and second deputy House Speaker selections show it still wields significant power—and more appointments are coming, with end-of-year retirements and reshuffles taking effect October 1. But in the broader picture, Phue Thai appears to be getting outmaneuvered by Bhumjaithai, as the latter is seen to be influencing or stacking “independent institutions”—like the EC and courts, which wield outsized authority to disqualify MPs, dissolve parties, and remove governments.

Share

Thaksin’s renewed public assertiveness has prompted analysts to ask whether he has struck a fresh deal with conservative elites. Recent political appointments suggest some level of signaling or quiet negotiation. In the latest cabinet reshuffle, the defense portfolio was left conspicuously vacant—reportedly to allow General Chalermpol Srisawat, a close protégé of former army chief General Apirat Kongsompong, now deputy lord chamberlain of the royal household, to assume the post once his senatorial cooling-off period ends on Sept. 30. Meanwhile this week, the cabinet unexpectedly deferred the nomination of Thaksin’s preferred candidate to head the Bank of Thailand, Vitai Ratanakorn. The other finalist, Roong Mallikamas, a career central bank official, is widely seen as the conservatives’ choice.

But political appointments are only part of the battle. If Thaksin wants to remain in power, he will need to broker a broader agreement—one that secures, at a minimum, conservative backing to keep Pheu Thai at the helm. Should Paetongtarn resign or be removed as prime minister, Pheu Thai would need the conservative United Thai Nation party to support its candidate, Chaikasem Nitisiri. A renewed agreement may also require protection for Thaksin himself, sparing him extended home incarceration if convicted in his pending royal defamation and abuse-of-privilege cases—charges that together carry a potential sentence of 15 years or more.

This is a risky bargain for the conservatives to back. Many in the bloc—including other coalition parties—consider Chaikasem a nonstarter, citing his past support for monarchy-related reforms. Now 76, he has a history of health issues, including a stroke, though he recently posted pictures of himself golfing and said in an interview that he is now fine. Despite this, questions remain about his fitness to serve. Moreover, Pheu Thai’s popularity has suffered a major blow following Paetongtarn’s leaked audio clip, with support plummeting from 28% to 11%. Propping up an unpopular Pheu Thai could come at a heavy price at the next polls.

Instead, conservatives may prefer a deal that puts their own man at the helm: former Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, currently a privy councilor. Prayut remains on the United Thai Nation’s list of prime ministerial candidates, so no special legal action would be required if he chose to step down from the council. There is also precedent for privy councilors resigning to assume the premiership, as noted by analyst Ken Lohatepanont. If appointed, he could legally serve for up to another year and seven months before reaching the eight-year constitutional term limit.

But for Prayut, returning to frontline politics would mean giving up his royal appointment in exchange for significant risks and uncertain rewards. He could frame the move as a noble duty to “rescue the nation” from political deadlock, and surprisingly, the public might accept that narrative. Recent polls show him as the most popular choice among the remaining party-nominated candidates, with 32.8% support compared to Chaikasem’s 10.9%. Still, his comeback would require backing from Pheu Thai, since United Thai Nation holds only 36 seats—though he would likely also gain support from several coalition parties, including opposition-aligned Bhumjaithai and Palang Pracharath.

Pressed hard enough, Thaksin may ultimately relent—allowing Pheu Thai MPs to vote in Prayut. In doing so, Pheu Thai would likely have to cede control of the Interior Ministry, a key ministry for influencing elections due to its large budget disbursements that reach the local level. This would also carry the risk of losing more seats in the next election—especially since Pheu Thai campaigned on opposing the 2014 coup-makers: Prayut, Prawit, and Anupong.

Still, this may be preferable to Bhumjaithai party leader Anutin Charnvirakul becoming prime minister through a lockup with the People’s Party. That alliance would hand the Interior Ministry right back to Bhumjaithai—undoing one of Pheu Thai’s few recent gains—and, more damaging still, would likely trigger an election by year’s end. Pheu Thai is in no position to face the voters, especially following Paetongtarn’s recent debacle. In fact, if an election were held today, the party risks dropping from the second to the third or fourth largest, based on the last election results.

If no deal is struck, Thaksin may resort to a last-ditch option: dissolving the House. However, legal uncertainty remains over whether acting Prime Minister Phumtham Wechayachai has the authority to request it. The constitution specifies only that the prime minister may propose dissolution, subject to royal approval. In any case, elections are the least-preferred outcome for either side—creating strong incentives to compromise, whether around Chaikasem or Prayut. The conservatives, for their part, also have a potential fallback option in Anutin—should he secure backing from the People’s Party.

For now, Thaksin is working every channel to buy time and secure agreements that will prolong his hold on power. But with mounting legal pressure—both on himself and his daughter—and waning public support, his leverage and options are increasingly constrained. While the conservatives are not in a much better position, they have more options and, importantly, additional levers of power and influence beyond parliament that remain unavailable to Thaksin. Ultimately, this gives them an edge in setting the terms for any new deal involving the former premier.

The by-election will replace Pheu Thai MP Amorntep Sommai, a three-term MP and local businessman who recently passed away. In the 2023 general election, Amorntep defeated Bhumjaithai’s Theera Traisoranakul in a fairly close race, winning by around 7,000 votes. Notably, the constituency lies on the Cambodian border, where voters are likely to have felt the impact of the ongoing bilateral dispute that has disrupted trade and engulfed the prime minister and her party.

The contest will be a “battle of the daughters,” with Pheu Thai’s Phurika “Kung” Sommai and Bhumjaithai’s Jintawan “Ajarn F” Traisoranakul—both daughters of the 2023 candidates—standing as new-generation leaders from influential political-business clans. Phurika has started a Facebook page for her campaign, announcing her candidacy and readiness to walk in her father’s footsteps. Jintawan is currently Chairwoman of the Sisaket Provincial Tourism Industry Council and previously served as a legislative aide. She also has a Facebook page. The People’s Party has announced it will not field a candidate, citing its expectation of a forthcoming House dissolution and general election.

Pheu Thai and Bhumjaithai have dominated recent elections in Sisaket. Pheu Thai won seven of the province’s nine seats in 2023, while Bhumjaithai secured the remaining two. More recently, in the February 2025 Provincial Administrative Organisation (PAO) election, Bhumjaithai’s Wichit Traisoranakul—Theera’s brother and the incumbent—defeated Pheu Thai’s Wiwat Chai. Former seat holder Pheu Thai’s Amorntep won his seat in 2001 under Chart Thai Pattana, in 2005 as a member of Thai Rak Thai, and in 2023 representing Pheu Thai.

Both parties are expected to pour considerable resources into this contest, including high-level political sponsorship and funding. Paetongtarn campaigned in Sisaket during the 2023 election, chanting on stage: “Chase out the rat (Anutin) and beat the cobras (defecting MPs),” though she later formed a coalition with Anutin. It would fit again now that Anutin has joined the opposition, but Pheu Thai may not want to remind voters of its own about-face. With Pheu Thai’s popularity sinking in national polls, the backing of party heavyweights may also do little to lift its local candidate. If Bhumjaithai wins the seat it will be able to more credibly claim the political tide is moving in its direction—which is crucial, given the government’s precarious position and the opposition’s growing strength.

With Prime Minister Paetongtarn suspended—and a strong likelihood that she will either resign or be removed by the court—the wafer-thin majority gives coalition partners significant leverage. Should Pheu Thai put forward Chaikasem as its candidate for prime minister, it will likely have to make significant concessions to keep its grip on power, especially with the People’s Party offering up all of its ministerial seats if parties support its proposal for a provisional government. The numbers could shift again, but for now, the situation can only be described as nerve-racking for the government.

The three MPs reduced from the House total are as follows:

• Ekkarach Changlao, Kla Tham Party, suspended by the Supreme Court

• Amorntep Sommai, Pheu Thai Party, passed away — waiting on a by-election. The by-election will be in Si Saket on August 10, with Pheu Thai and Bhum Jai Thai going head-to-head. This will be a huge popularity test following Bhum Jai Thai’s defection to the opposition and Paetongtarn’s leaked audio clip.

• Suchart Chomklin, United Nation Party, resigned from the party-list

Chaikasem is not a familiar name outside of political circles. His polling numbers are unknown, but would likely fall in the single digits to low-teens. Now 76 —one year senior to Thaksin—he is a trained lawyer who served as a public prosecutor and attorney general before becoming justice minister in the Yingluck Shinawatra government. Over the past weekend, PPTV aired a one-on-one interview with him, providing insight into his background, health, and opinion on key issues, including potentially becoming the next prime minister.

The first issue discussed was his health and fitness—a key concern that could affect both public confidence and his ability to serve in office. Chaikasem stated that he had previously suffered a stroke but has now recovered. He said the blood clot and smaller clots have since dissolved, and that he does not need surgery or require medication. According to him, doctors offered little further advice apart from avoiding the heat—hence his new preference for early tee times. Photos showing him playing golf recently surfaced—almost certainly a strategic move to signal that his health has improved.

The interview then turned to his relationship with Thaksin, and the question on everyone’s mind: if he becomes prime minister, will he be his own man or simply a puppet? Chaikasem stated emphatically that he will not be bossed around and that he will speak his mind when he disagrees. He explained that while he is not stubborn and is willing to listen, he believes a leader must have full decision-making authority. Chaikasem noted that he is not as close to Thaksin as he is to Yingluck, whose government he served in. Still, he believes Thaksin has a certain level of trust in him and sees him as someone he can talk to.

Notably, Chaikasem stated that he is not actively seeking the role of prime minister but would accept it if called upon, stressing that he is content in retirement—playing golf and spending time with his children and grandchildren. His remarks could be seen as a show of respect for Paetongtarn who is still technically the prime minister. They also help cast Chaikasem as the elder statesman—unambitious, unthreatening, and above the political fray. Just as importantly, they send a clear message to Thaksin that his influence has limits: push too hard, and he may simply walk away.

The interview also addressed contentious issues such as the entertainment complex bill and his earlier remarks on the royal defamation law (Section 112 of the Criminal Code). On the entertainment bill, Chaikasem said that he is not opposed to legalizing casinos and gambling, acknowledging that people like it and better to bring it above ground, but warned that there needs to be clear, well-defined regulations—it cannot become a free-for-all. Discussing 112, he said his position is not to amend the law, as it has already been debated and enacted. Rather, his concern is with how the law is enforced by the authorities.

Chaikasem’s interview offered a rare glimpse of the man who may soon find himself as the next prime minister. He appeared in decent health and spoke thoughtfully on the issues—enough, at least, to maybe ease some concerns about his fitness for office. He projected the image of a seasoned hand, unlikely to repeat the missteps that have recently plagued Paetongtarn. As a leader, he is likely to embody a principled pragmatism: grounded in law and reason, measured in tone, and open to differing views and perspectives.

Chaikasem is undoubtedly well-credentialed and may offer a dose of much-needed political maturity. But Pheu Thai is on life-support. What the party requires is a crash economic program—one that installs capable hands and delivers results at lightening speed. That, in turn, demands leadership with vision, charisma, and the political authority to push through urgent reforms. Chaikasem is not that kind of leader. He is not a visionary, and it is far from clear that Thaksin would grant him the autonomy needed to carry out sweeping changes. His style favors caution and deliberation over bold, decisive action.

Like former Prime Minister Srettha, Chaikasem is also a political outsider, which will make it difficult for him to navigate party factions or manage an unruly coalition with a slim majority. The bureaucracy, meanwhile, tends to respond only when the leadership situation is clear—something that is unlikely to happen with Chaikasem because he will be viewed as a transitional leader. Pheu Thai’s dismal poll numbers and bleak political outlook reflect a collapse in confidence, one that extends into the bureaucracy itself. At best, Chaikasem may serve as a stabilizer while the party regroups. At worst, he risks being entirely ineffectual, deepening the political damage and further eroding the party’s credibility.

Vitai’s last-minute entry into the race strongly suggests that he has secured important political backing to make a credible bid. In fact, it has been rumored that a powerful political figure asked him to leave GSB and join the contest. Vitai’s track record at GSB—including initiatives such as the Social Bank to support SMEs and grassroots borrowers—aligns closely with the government’s economic agenda, making him a natural choice. Notably, Pichai himself has publicly said that the next governor should be able to “work smoothly” with the Finance Ministry.

On the other hand, Vitai’s entrance as an outsider to the bank could create its own set of challenges. The bank has a distinctive institutional culture, and Vitai’s academic and work credentials do not particularly align. Additionally, Vitai’s political ties could raise questions about the bank’s independence, a core element of its culture. With Roong, this would not be the case. Her PhD in economics from MIT and two decades of experience at the bank bring immediate credibility—and, importantly, help preserve morale. Indeed, some have remarked that a Vitai appointment would be seen as a “revolution in the bank.”

A Vitai governorship could also be unsettling to financial markets. While Vitai would undoubtedly help smooth economic policy coordination between the bank and government, such coziness could concern investors that policymaking may become unbalanced, favoring narrow political interests over long-term macro-stability. For example, there could be pressure for aggressive interest rate cuts, currency depreciations, and government debt arrangements that markets may find imprudent, but which the government sees as essential to bring relief and growth to the economy. Consequently, markets could react negatively by reducing their financial exposure to the Thai market.

The last true insider to lead the bank was Tarisa Watanagase, who was appointed in 2006 by the conservative, post-coup government of Surayud Chulanont. This trend does not particularly favor Roong, but the current political situation makes the appointment less straightforward. Thaksin has a history of pushing against conservative forces through his policies and appointments, which could give Vitai an edge. At the same time, as the son of former Supreme Court President Sophon Ratanakorn, he could find acceptance among many conservatives.

That said, the recent leak of Prime Minister Paetongtarn’s phone conversation with former Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen has shaken the government, which may lead Thaksin to think twice before pushing Vitai and potentially triggering yet another political firestorm for his daughter’s already embattled government. Some even suggest the appointment could be used as a bargaining chip. Others say Thaksin may have already stepped back, citing a remark from Vitai that “he will be here [GSB] long-term.”

Stay tuned—we should know very soon how this high-stakes appointment plays out.

The complete meltdown in Thai-Cambodian relations is astonishing—just a month ago, ties between the Shinawatra and Hun families were considered almost familial. Hun Sen’s photo showing the rooms where former prime ministers Thaksin and Yingluck Shinawatra once took political refuge attests to this closeness. In April, Paetongtarn made an official visit to Phnom Penh, where she signed a host of agreements and met privately with the Hun family. What, then, explains the sudden and seismic rupture in the relationship between the two families—and the two countries?

A common explanation by analysts is that Cambodian domestic politics is driving the conflict. That is, the Cambodian regime—led by former Prime Minister Hun Sen and his son, current Prime Minister Hun Manet—is politically weak and in need of shoring up popular support. To this end, it has turned to the tried-and-tested tactic of stoking nationalism, seizing on the disputed temples and territory along the Thai-Cambodian border—longstanding flashpoints for antagonism and conflict.

The February 13 incident at Prasat Ta Muen Thom—a disputed ancient Khmer temple—was the first in a series of events that escalated tensions. The confrontation began when a group of military-connected Cambodian housewives sang their national anthem in front of the temple, provoking a verbal altercation with Thai soldiers. Tensions spiraled in the weeks that followed, with a mysterious fire at the symbolic Trimuak Pavilion and a brief firefight at Chong Bok that killed one Cambodian soldier. Soon after, Cambodia filed a case with the International Court of Justice; the phone clip was released; and two border crossings were closed.

But the argument that the Hun Manet government is politically weak—so much so that it would risk jeopardizing its relationship with the Shinawatras—is unconvincing. The Cambodian People’s Party firmly controls parliament, holding 125 out of 130 seats. Elections are also not imminent: commune elections are scheduled for 2027, and the general election for 2028. Opposition critics, though active, are mostly operating from abroad due to harsh political repression inside Cambodia. Trump tariffs are an economic risk, but the World Bank still forecasts 4.0 percent growth for 2025. Aside from long-standing factional competition between the Hun and Tea families, there is little to suggest the regime faces serious political danger.

Another theory, aired recently on Thai news channel PPTV, holds that the root of the conflict is business—not politics. Specifically, it suggests Cambodian casino interests—closely linked to the Hun regime—are pitted against Paetongtarn’s Entertainment Complex bill. If passed, the bill would legalize casino gaming in Thailand and threaten to divert hundreds of millions of dollars annually from border casinos in Poipet, Koh Kong, and even Phnom Penh, where most punters are day-trippers from Thailand. The Poipet casinos alone generate an estimated $500 million annually. The potential loss of this business would be catastrophic, creating a powerful incentive for those interests to want to derail the bill.

From the Hun’s perspective, the bill could even be interpreted as a personal affront. After providing refuge to the Shinawatra family during periods of political turmoil, they are now confronted with a policy spearheaded by the Shinawatras that threatens to drain hundreds of millions of dollars from their political-business network. This could have been mitigated by offering the Hun family and their network a stake in the new Thai casino ventures. Instead, it is possible they were brushed aside in favor of other investors—a slight that may have only deepened the Hun’s resentment.

The business conflict theory is more compelling than the “failing regime” resorts to nationalism narrative. However, it remains difficult to substantiate, and it still stretches credulity to believe the Hun regime would manufacture a border crisis with the explicit aim of toppling the Thai government—thereby derailing the casino bill—all without risking a broader escalation that inflicts more economic harm than the casino business is worth. That risk is already becoming apparent: border closures are disrupting trade, and Thai punters are spooked from crossing into Cambodia. And yet, none of this fully explains the dramatic collapse in the once-remarkably close relationship between the Shinawatra-Hun families—underscoring the opacity of both countries political economies.

Indeed, the governorship itself is replete with partisan clashes. In 2001, then Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra removed Governor M.R. Chatumongkol Sonakul. More recently, Governor Sethaput has openly criticized Pheu Thai’s 10,000-baht digital cash handout, while the party has repeatedly urged the Bank to cut interest rates to stimulate growth. Even for the BOT board chair, Kittiratt Na-Ranong—a former adviser to Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin—was disqualified due to his prior political affiliations with the government.

Media reporting suggests this appointment will be no different. Conservatives are said to favour BOT insider Roong Mallikamas, who has steadily risen through the ranks over her two-decade career at the Bank. There is also Kobsak Pootrakool, a capable technocrat and former minister attached to the Prime Minister’s Office under the conservative, military-led Prayuth Chan-o-cha government, as well as a spokesperson for the Palang Pracharath Party.

Meanwhile, candidates Sutthapha Amornwiwat, Vikran Supamongkol and Somprawin Manpraert are seen as close to the Pheu Thai Party. Sutthapha’s first cousin, Julapun Amornvivat, is the Deputy Finance Minister from Pheu Thai. An influential Khun Ying from a major political party is reportedly backing her as well. As for Vikran, he is the nephew of Kantathi Suphamongkhon, a former Thai trade representative and foreign minister under Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Then there is Somprawin, chief of the SCB Economic Intelligence Center, who has supporters among the Prime Minister’s Baan Phitsanulok advisory team.

Second-timer Anusorn Tamajai is also in the race, having run in 2020. He is linked to the Pridi Banomyong Institute and Foundation—non-profit organisations promoting Thailand’s economic and social development. Pridi, as finance minister, played a key role initiating the Bank of Thailand Act which led to the Bank’s establishment in 1942. He later served a brief stint as prime minister.

And finally, just days before the deadline, Vitai Ratanakorn stepped down from the Government Savings Bank (GSB) to enter the race, suggesting strong support signals of his own. While at GSB, he led government debt relief policies such as the “You Fight, We Help” program, as well as a new scheme to ease debt burdens for about 500,000 people. Given Pheu Thai’s household debt agenda, his appointment would not be unwelcome.

All eyes will now be on the Selection Committee and which two finalists it proposes to the finance minister for cabinet submission by July 2. The next governor will take the helm at a critical time, with Thailand facing mounting economic challenges—from a trade war with the US to sluggish growth. The outcome may also hint at broader political dynamics. A Pheu Thai-aligned pick would signal a strong government hand; other choices could suggest compromise—or a tilt toward conservative influence.

Chadchart won the Bangkok gubernatorial election in 2022 by a landslide, securing 51.8 percent of the vote. He garnered 1,386,215 votes—well ahead of his closest rivals: Suchatvee Suwansawat of the Democrat Party, with 254,647 votes, and Wiroj Lakkhanaadisorn of the Move Forward Party, with 253,851.

Chadchart previously served as transport minister from October 2012 to May 2014, under the Pheu Thai-led government of PM Yingluck Shinawatra. During his tenure, he earned a reputation for a hands-on, technocratic approach with emphasis on infrastructure. The role helped cement his image as a capable and pragmatic leader, paving the way for his successful run for governor. Though previously linked to the Pheu Thai Party, Chadchart ran as an independent, capitalising on his broad popularity and strong name recognition.

In March, Chadchart confirmed he would run for a second term in the next election, scheduled for June 2026. His campaign will center on continued engagement with residents through the weekly 'Governor on Tour' events held every Sunday.

Chadchart 3 Year Poll Results

33.7KB ∙ PDF file

Download

Download

Military and political leaders have since de-escalated the situation, and a full-blown conflict appears unlikely, particularly given the strong ties between the countries’ top leadership, including former prime ministers Hun Sen and Thaksin Shinawatra.

The clash at Chong Bok, located in the disputed Emerald Triangle, erupted after several months of increasing tensions. In early February, a group of Cambodian visitors sang their national anthem at the ancient Khmer-Hindu Ta Muen Thom Temple, drawing the intervention of Thai soldiers. The group reportedly included the wife of a senior Cambodian soldier. Ta Muen Thom’s ownership is disputed, with Cambodia citing a 1907 French colonial-era map to justify its claim while Thailand relies on maps from the Royal Thai Survey Department.

Later in February, tensions escalated further when a controversial fire destroyed the Trimuak Pavilion, a small religious site in Chong Bok, located 275 km from Ta Muen Thom. The Trimuak Pavilion, though small, holds significant historical weight. Constructed in the early 1990s through a tripartite effort involving soldiers from Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand, the pavilion features a distinctive three-sided gable roof, each side bearing a national symbol from one of the three countries.

Beyond its architectural features, the pavilion stood as a symbol of regional reconciliation. It reflected the shift in Thai foreign policy under then-Prime Minister Gen. Chatchai Choonhavan, who sought to transform Indochina “from a battlefield into a marketplace.” In the late 1980s, the area around Chong Bok had been the scene of fierce fighting among Thai, Khmer Rouge, Cambodian, and Vietnamese forces.

That vision of cooperation was embodied in the pavilion’s construction, which was coordinated by Lt. Gen. Issarapong Noonpakdee, then commander of the 2nd Army Region. Ironically, Issarapong later helped topple Chatchai in a coup and briefly served as Army Commander-in-Chief. His legacy remains relevant today: his son, Gen. Songwit Noonpakdee, is now Supreme Commander of the Thai Armed Forces and heads the Border Threat Mitigation Center, serving as a crucial link between the military and civilian leadership.

It remains unclear whether these incidents were isolated or part of an orchestrated campaign by elite string-pullers to advance a self-serving or narrowly nationalist agenda—see the 2008–2011 Preah Vihear Temple crisis. Either way, the renewed land border tensions risk further complicating the economically critical negotiations over the Overlapping Claims Area (OCA) in the Gulf of Thailand, which is among the Pheu Thai government’s top ten priorities. The 27,000 km² OCA is believed to contain roughly 11 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, worth an estimated $300 billion.

Despite past frictions, both governments have expressed a willingness to cooperate. In 2001, a memorandum of understanding was signed by the foreign ministers of Hun Sen and Thaksin Shinawatra, establishing a framework and a Joint Technical Committee (JTC) to negotiate maritime boundaries and resource development. The OCA regained momentum during the Prayuth Chan-ocha government but has since stalled under the Pheu Thai-led government.

PM Paetongtarn pledged in November 2024 that her Cabinet would take up the JTC appointments within weeks, but nothing materialized. Cambodia has stated it is ready and waiting for its Thai counterparts. During her official two-day visit to Cambodia in April, the OCA was absent from the agenda, and she made no substantive comments to the media. When asked, Paetongtarn deflected, directing reporters to the TV Pool’s meeting readout.

While the government may be prioritising other matters, such as the casino bill, over the politically sensitive OCA, its continued stonewalling raises questions about whether other actors and interests are also holding back the JTC appointments. With attention now diverted to rising tensions on the land border, the prospect of renewed progress on the OCA appears more distant than ever.

Parliament is expected to revisit the bill when the next session opens July 3rd. The bill must pass three readings in the House of Representatives, a process that could be protracted due to anticipated disagreements and negotiations. The Senate, largely dominated by BJT, will also get to voice its opinion on the bill, though it shouldn’t be a stumbling block if the party votes in favor during the House vote.

To secure BJT’s support, PT will ultimately need to pay a political price — either through sharing casino spoils, easing political attacks such as those involving BJT’s alleged collusion in the Senate elections, or both. If unwilling, PT may back down and drop the bill, though that would seriously damage its credibility and raise concerns about its ability to govern and maintain coalition unity. It would also, once again, put the kibosh on Thaksin’s long-standing dream of having legal casinos in Thailand — one he originally pitched as prime minister in the early 2000s and again a decade later when his sister Yingluck was premier, before her ousting by the military.

High-profile switchers to KT include Krit Chevathamanon, a People’s Party (PP) MP from Chon Buri; Anudit Nakornthap of Thai Sang Thai; Karun Hosakul, a Bangkok MP; and Ekkarat Changlao, a Bhum Jai Thai (BJT) MP from Khon Kaen. Though not joining KT, the resignations of Palang Pracharath Party deputy leaders Uttama Savanayana and Sonthirat Sontijirawong are another blow to party leader Prawit Wongsuwan, raising fresh questions about its future.

More defections to KT—said to be in the pipeline—could tempt the lead coalition party PT to oust BJT, though such a gambit would be risky and likely a last resort, as it would leave the government with only a slim majority. For now, PT and BJT will likely continue their marriage of convenience, as neither is inclined to face off against the PP in a general election that could end in a rout.