The government’s coalition dinner on Tuesday captured most of the day’s media attention, as party bigwigs gathered to discuss their uncertain political future. The Pheu Thai–led event was intended to project unity within a weakened coalition that now governs with the slimmest of majorities, while being beset by multiple crises—whether in the economy, in the courts, or along the border with Cambodia.
The evening’s headliner, of course, was former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra—Pheu Thai’s unofficial leader and, more recently, the self-appointed “national clerk.” His keynote speech was said to be light on strategic substance and heavy on nostalgic detours, though the message was clear: he’s still in charge, and the need to deliver results is urgent. That urgency, however, may also hint at growing desperation, as the party scrambles to assert control where it has been outflanked by opponents like the Bhumjaithai Party.
Meanwhile, largely overshadowed by the dinner theater, the Cabinet made a much-anticipated economic appointment, naming Vitai Ratanakorn as the next governor of the Bank of Thailand. Vitai, 54, comes from the Government Savings Bank and edged out Roong Mallikamas, a central bank insider. His appointment is widely seen as Thaksin’s choice, with reports suggesting the decision came down to: “We want someone who will work for us.” This move signals Thaksin is going full throttle—brushing aside concerns of a conservative backlash.
With Vitai in place, the government now effectively controls both fiscal and monetary policy. Supporters argue that his leadership could revive growth through lower interest rates, a more competitive baht, and reduced debt burdens for small borrowers. Critics, however, warn that monetary policy risks becoming politicized—subject to short-term political pressure and disconnected from macroeconomic fundamentals. Most investors expect central bank independence and institutional neutrality, and any perception of political interference would raise red flags.
Ironically, when Finance Minister Pichai Chunhavajira was asked why Vitai was chosen, he replied: “There were several qualified candidates, but let’s observe how the market responds.” The market responded indeed: the SET dropped more than 1% by the close after the announcement. Markets are a random walk, of course—but the timing of the appointment and the market’s reaction was difficult to ignore.
Speculation has since emerged that Roong may resign and take early retirement. Vitai’s first meeting as chair of the Monetary Policy Committee is scheduled for October 8. Given his close alignment with the government and the bank’s conservative orthodoxy, it is worth watching whether upcoming MPC votes become more contested—and whether monetary policy begins drifting in a more populist direction, or strikes a healthier balance.
Several other significant appointments were made on Tuesday. First, the Senate—dominated by Bhumjaithai—appointed Sarawut Songsivilai, a former Highways Department director-general, to the Constitutional Court. Sarawut is reportedly tied to the Bhumjaithai network, having previously served under Saksayam Chidchob, the former transport minister and brother of party power broker Newin Chidchob. At the same time, the Senate voted down Sutthum Chueaprakhobkit, a public administration academic who has served as an adviser to Justice Minister Tawee Sodsong.
The Senate also appointed Narong Klanwarin, currently a Supreme Court judge, to the Election Commission (EC), while nine-term Pheu Thai MP from Roi-Et, Chalard Khamchuang, was selected by the House as the second deputy House Speaker, replacing the vacancy left by Bhumjaithai when it moved into the opposition.
Phue Thai’s Bank of Thailand governor and second deputy House Speaker selections show it still wields significant power—and more appointments are coming, with end-of-year retirements and reshuffles taking effect October 1. But in the broader picture, Phue Thai appears to be getting outmaneuvered by Bhumjaithai, as the latter is seen to be influencing or stacking “independent institutions”—like the EC and courts, which wield outsized authority to disqualify MPs, dissolve parties, and remove governments.