Court Rulings Push Politics to the Knife’s Edge
Several high-profile court cases and investigations are unfolding, each with the potential to reshape Thailand’s political landscape in the coming weeks. This is a snapshot of where those cases stand—and how political pundits are interpreting their possible outcomes.
Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s Hun Sen “Leaked Tape” Case
The Constitutional Court will hear testimony from Paetongtarn and a single National Security Council official on August 21, after the court allowed only one of several witnesses she had requested. Closing arguments are scheduled for August 27, with judges set to vote and announce their ruling on August 29 at 3 p.m.
The prevailing expectation is that the court will find Paetongtarn guilty and remove her from office. An initial 7–2 vote to suspend Paetongtarn suggests a strong leaning against her. Previous rulings have removed prime ministers for far less—including Samak Sundaravej’s payment for a cooking show, Yingluck Shinawatra’s improper transfer of a state official, and Srettha Thavisin’s appointment of a minister with a checkered past.
The court’s reputation may also weigh on its deliberations. A ruling in Paetongtarn’s favour could prove damaging, given that public and military opinion is broadly unfavourable towards her. A recent NIDA Poll found that over 54% of respondents had no confidence in her government’s ability to protect the national interest.
A small minority view holds that Paetongtarn may avoid conviction, as her father did in 2001. Then, Thaksin was cleared in an 8–7 ruling that found no deliberate concealment of his assets. Paetongtarn’s defense similarly rests on claims of good-faith conduct. Yet Thaksin had just come off a commanding election victory, whereas today the Shinawatras and Pheu Thai have never been more unpopular.
Rumors abounded earlier this week that Paetongtarn may resign before the verdict if she receives indications of an adverse outcome—or if a deal is struck exchanging her resignation for other political concessions. Asked by reporters on Tuesday, she smiled but did not reply, in contrast to previous occasions when she flatly dismissed calls to step down.
Pheu Thai urged the court on the same day to postpone the ruling for six months, citing the need for continuity of leadership to deal with pressing foreign and domestic challenges. The court’s announcement of the verdict date the next day suggested that plea was summarily ignored.
Former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s Lese Majeste, Computer Crimes, and Hospital Stay Cases
Thaksin faces charges under Section 112 of the Criminal Code and the Computer Crimes Act over a 2015 interview with South Korean media, which prosecutors say insulted the monarchy. Together, the charges carry a possible sentence of three to 15 years in prison. The Criminal Court is due to deliver its verdict on August 22.
Any conviction would almost certainly be appealed by Thaksin’s lawyers; the public prosecutor would do the same if he were acquitted. Pundits downplay the political impact of the case, noting that a final ruling will come well after more consequential ones, like his daughter’s and the Section 144 case. Opinion is equally divided on whether the court will convict him.
Thaksin also faces allegations that he received preferential treatment on the 14th floor of the Police General Hospital during his one-year sentence. A guilty verdict by the Supreme Court’s Criminal Division for Holders of Political Office could reinstate the one-year term, though his age would allow him to request serving the term outside prison, possibly at home. The verdict is due on September 9.
Many commentators expect a conviction in this case, sparking speculation over whether Thaksin will remain in the country or leave once more. Others suggest the court could spare him while punishing the officials responsible for his treatment. Backroom deals to avoid punishment cannot be ruled out in any of these cases.
National Anti-Corruption Commission’s Section 144 Case
The National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) is currently reviewing several complaints under Section 144 of the Constitution, including one tied to the digital wallet program implicating 309 MPs, 175 senators, and the cabinet. If the NACC finds merit, cases will be referred to the Constitutional Court for a final ruling within 15 days, according to petitioner and former Constitution Drafting Committee advisor Jade Donavanik.
Punishments could range from light to severe depending on the court’s interpretation. MPs or senators unaware of violations might receive leniency, whereas cabinet members and budget committee officials are more likely to be held culpable. Donavanik, who has his own stake, puts the likelihood of removal for all those accused at 70–80 percent, citing the court’s recent precedent-setting decision against Pheu Thai MP Pichet Chuamuangphan.
The NACC accepted the case on June 9, pledging to conclude within 60 days, by August 9. That deadline has passed, and the decision remains pending. The petitioners pressed the NACC this week to move more quickly, but it is not legally bound to the deadline and could delay further while the Paetongtarn case is decided.
Instability to Persist Regardless of Court Convictions or Acquittals
Political instability will endure, whatever the courts decide. Some rulings may prove more disruptive than others, but volatility is set to remain a defining feature in the weeks—and possibly months—ahead.
The form this takes will hinge on the verdicts, each carrying distinct risks.
A verdict in favor of Paetongtarn would stoke the loose anti-Shinawatra coalition, including the military. Protests would likely follow, again calling for her resignation. Some groups might push for a House dissolution, while more extreme elements could demand a military putsch. Given the government’s very low approval ratings, such movements could attract more supporters—or at least greater public sympathy.
Even if Chaikasem replaces her, his tenure could falter quickly, lacking the mandate and credibility to reassure the public, military, or bureaucracy. As Thaksin’s choice and without a political base of his own, he would struggle to assert independence and command over the coalition. His past stance on monarchy reform may also invite fresh lawfare. Pheu Thai’s fortunes are unlikely to recover under him, and his leadership could hasten a House dissolution—or produce other unforeseen consequences.
Further uncertainty could come from a Section 144 ruling removing the cabinet and much of parliament. Permanent secretaries would run day-to-day affairs while the legislature lay paralyzed. If remaining MPs resigned, Article 5—which requires unresolved matters to follow “constitutional practice” under the King—could come into play. Its ambiguity leaves it unclear how the deadlock would be resolved, whether through the court allowing the Election Commission to hold an election or by less democratic means.
A less turbulent outcome could occur if the People’s Party’s proposal for a transitional government with a clear, limited mandate is adopted. It would have the party back a prime minister candidate, possibly Bhumjaithai leader Anutin Charnvirakul, but not formally join the new government. The party would receive constitutional reform commitments, followed by a House dissolution and election.
Pundits are divided on its chance of success: some dismiss it as impractical, while others see it as an appealing out for coalition partners, offering more cabinet posts and a chance to limit electoral damage from association with an unpopular Pheu Thai.
Many other scenarios remain in play: the possible return of Prayut Chan-o-cha, an attempt by acting prime minister Phumtham Wechayachai to dissolve the House—potentially challenged in court or rebuffed by the palace—and outcomes yet unimagined. The rest of the month, and likely beyond, promises to test political loyalties and institutions, keeping all sides on edge and observers guessing.