Thai-Cambodian Border War Raises Risks of Coup and Power Play
Tensions along the Thai-Cambodian border erupted into a full-blown conflagration last week, resulting in significant casualties, mass displacement, and heightened domestic political anxieties. The political conversation has rapidly shifted from concerns over the government’s slim parliamentary majority to fears of another military coup—or at least a partial, half-baked version of one.
If the military were to intervene—something it has done 22 times since 1932—it would likely move on two grounds: the need for an impartial figure to safeguard national interests, and the absence of clear, unified leadership within the current government. While other reasons might be cited, these two are the most credible and relevant to the present context.
Former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his daughter, suspended Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, are accused of precipitating the crisis—due to a falling out with the former Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen over opaque personal dealings.
Critics argue that this family feud has left the government irreparably compromised, with national security decisions now entangled in a complicated web of personal and political interests. The only remedy, they contend, is to remove the Shinawatras and their network from power and install an honest broker.
The absence of unified leadership has added to the growing unease. Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra remains suspended from duty, and the defense portfolio remains unfilled. Meanwhile, Acting Prime Minister Phumtham Wechayachai has struggled to project authority, drawing criticism for deflecting responsibility early in the crisis and focusing instead on his new role as Interior Minister. His characterization of the BM-21 rocket barrages and F-16 airstrikes as merely a “clash” further undermined confidence in his command of the situation.
Foreign Minister Maris Sangiampongsa, a longtime Thaksin ally, has also come under strong criticism for a slow and muted response to the crisis, allowing Cambodia to seize control of the narrative—particularly in international media and diplomatic circles. Although Maris has since issued press statements and given briefings, including shuttling to New York for the UN Security Council meeting, it will take a sustained effort to dispel the perception of an absentee minister acting under Thaksin’s direction.
The Shinawatras’ conflict of interest—and, by extension, that of the entire cabinet—combined with a leadership vacuum, has created fertile ground for military intervention. This could take the form of a direct takeover by the army chief and infantry units or unfold through a more circuitous route involving a parliamentary realignment that brings back former Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha. The latter scenario is currently seen as more likely by political watchers.
A direct coup is the least preferred option because it would reward Hun Sen—who has openly called for regime change—while the economic and diplomatic fallout from the U.S. and European capitals could be severe. Moreover, the military is already fully engaged in the border conflict, making political management an unwelcome additional burden.
In any case, the government has already ceded much of its authority to the armed forces to manage the situation. If—and it is a big if—the government does not interfere with or undermine the military’s position, a coup may prove unnecessary.
If not a direct military takeover, the more likely route would be a parliamentary power play akin to 2008, when political factions—under military pressure—abandoned Thaksin’s People’s Power Party-led coalition following a court-ordered dissolution and joined with the Democrats to install Abhisit Vejjajiva as prime minister.
Under this scenario, a parliamentary realignment would follow Paetongtarn’s likely removal from office by the Constitutional Court. A new coalition would then form—drawing votes from both government and opposition blocs—and elect former Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha as Paetongtarn’s replacement.
The case for Prayut over Pheu Thai’s candidate, Chaikasem Nitisiri, has strengthened due to the recent military outbreak, though it is not guaranteed. Prayut is seen by many as having crucial leadership qualities that Chaikasem lacks—most notably military experience, a perception of political neutrality, and a degree of baramee .
He may also be better positioned to manage relations with Hun Sen, given their shared military backgrounds and the relatively stable border relations during Prayut’s tenure. In Prayut’s final year, the two countries resumed talks over the Overlapping Claims Area in the Gulf of Thailand—discussions that could pave the way for joint development of oil and gas reserves estimated at up to $300 billion.
Prayut’s return would be permissible under parliamentary rules—he is one of United Thai Nation Party’s official candidates—though it would nearly amount to a backdoor coup. With Prayut at the helm, the leadership vacuum would be filled, and the government and military's strategic posture and communications would be aligned. The public is also more likely to view Prayut as a neutral figure who can be trusted to safeguard national interests, compared to Thaksin.
That said, some political camps question whether the military can truly serve as an honest broker on border issues, given its reported deep ties to grey business syndicates that profit from both legal and illicit cross-border trade. It’s also worth noting that Hun Sen’s call for regime change may reflect a belief that his political network’s casino, call center, and other grey business interests along the border would be more likely to thrive under Thailand’s previous power arrangement.
Whether there is a military coup, a parliamentary power play, or Pheu Thai simply remaining in power, the underlying drivers of this conflict point strongly to a mix of dynastic conflict between the Shinawatra and Hun clans and Hun Sen’s ambition to cement his legacy through political and military victories—while strengthening the position of his son, whose premiership remains relatively untested.