Thaksin Seeks New Deal with Conservatives to Retain Power

Thailand’s Pheu Thai-led government is hanging by a thread with Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra suspended and facing possible removal by the Constitutional Court. At the same time, the coalition holds a razor-thin majority that could unravel with a single defection. Yet her father, former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and de facto party leader, continues to project confidence. At a Nation Group Exclusive Talk last week, he declared, “I’m still here—you can’t remove me.” Days later, he oversaw a strategy meeting on U.S. tariffs at the prime minister’s official residence—departing from his usual, quieter style of behind-the-scenes influence conducted from his private residence, Ban Chan Song La.

Thaksin’s renewed public assertiveness has prompted analysts to ask whether he has struck a fresh deal with conservative elites. Recent political appointments suggest some level of signaling or quiet negotiation. In the latest cabinet reshuffle, the defense portfolio was left conspicuously vacant—reportedly to allow General Chalermpol Srisawat, a close protégé of former army chief General Apirat Kongsompong, now deputy lord chamberlain of the royal household, to assume the post once his senatorial cooling-off period ends on Sept. 30. Meanwhile this week, the cabinet unexpectedly deferred the nomination of Thaksin’s preferred candidate to head the Bank of Thailand, Vitai Ratanakorn. The other finalist, Roong Mallikamas, a career central bank official, is widely seen as the conservatives’ choice.

But political appointments are only part of the battle. If Thaksin wants to remain in power, he will need to broker a broader agreement—one that secures, at a minimum, conservative backing to keep Pheu Thai at the helm. Should Paetongtarn resign or be removed as prime minister, Pheu Thai would need the conservative United Thai Nation party to support its candidate, Chaikasem Nitisiri. A renewed agreement may also require protection for Thaksin himself, sparing him extended home incarceration if convicted in his pending royal defamation and abuse-of-privilege cases—charges that together carry a potential sentence of 15 years or more.

This is a risky bargain for the conservatives to back. Many in the bloc—including other coalition parties—consider Chaikasem a nonstarter, citing his past support for monarchy-related reforms. Now 76, he has a history of health issues, including a stroke, though he recently posted pictures of himself golfing and said in an interview that he is now fine. Despite this, questions remain about his fitness to serve. Moreover, Pheu Thai’s popularity has suffered a major blow following Paetongtarn’s leaked audio clip, with support plummeting from 28% to 11%. Propping up an unpopular Pheu Thai could come at a heavy price at the next polls.

Instead, conservatives may prefer a deal that puts their own man at the helm: former Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, currently a privy councilor. Prayut remains on the United Thai Nation’s list of prime ministerial candidates, so no special legal action would be required if he chose to step down from the council. There is also precedent for privy councilors resigning to assume the premiership, as noted by analyst Ken Lohatepanont. If appointed, he could legally serve for up to another year and seven months before reaching the eight-year constitutional term limit.

But for Prayut, returning to frontline politics would mean giving up his royal appointment in exchange for significant risks and uncertain rewards. He could frame the move as a noble duty to “rescue the nation” from political deadlock, and surprisingly, the public might accept that narrative. Recent polls show him as the most popular choice among the remaining party-nominated candidates, with 32.8% support compared to Chaikasem’s 10.9%. Still, his comeback would require backing from Pheu Thai, since United Thai Nation holds only 36 seats—though he would likely also gain support from several coalition parties, including opposition-aligned Bhumjaithai and Palang Pracharath.

Pressed hard enough, Thaksin may ultimately relent—allowing Pheu Thai MPs to vote in Prayut. In doing so, Pheu Thai would likely have to cede control of the Interior Ministry, a key ministry for influencing elections due to its large budget disbursements that reach the local level. This would also carry the risk of losing more seats in the next election—especially since Pheu Thai campaigned on opposing the 2014 coup-makers: Prayut, Prawit, and Anupong.

Still, this may be preferable to Bhumjaithai party leader Anutin Charnvirakul becoming prime minister through a lockup with the People’s Party. That alliance would hand the Interior Ministry right back to Bhumjaithai—undoing one of Pheu Thai’s few recent gains—and, more damaging still, would likely trigger an election by year’s end. Pheu Thai is in no position to face the voters, especially following Paetongtarn’s recent debacle. In fact, if an election were held today, the party risks dropping from the second to the third or fourth largest, based on the last election results.

If no deal is struck, Thaksin may resort to a last-ditch option: dissolving the House. However, legal uncertainty remains over whether acting Prime Minister Phumtham Wechayachai has the authority to request it. The constitution specifies only that the prime minister may propose dissolution, subject to royal approval. In any case, elections are the least-preferred outcome for either side—creating strong incentives to compromise, whether around Chaikasem or Prayut. The conservatives, for their part, also have a potential fallback option in Anutin—should he secure backing from the People’s Party.

For now, Thaksin is working every channel to buy time and secure agreements that will prolong his hold on power. But with mounting legal pressure—both on himself and his daughter—and waning public support, his leverage and options are increasingly constrained. While the conservatives are not in a much better position, they have more options and, importantly, additional levers of power and influence beyond parliament that remain unavailable to Thaksin. Ultimately, this gives them an edge in setting the terms for any new deal involving the former premier.